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Introduction
Since the publication of The Great Divergence, written by Kenneth Pomeranz, in 2000,1) global historians have
debated when and how the Great Divergence occurred. For example, Joel Mokyer2) and Jan Luiten van Zanden
emphasise the importance of the ‘Knowledge Economy’.3) Gregory Clark4) insists that in Britain, as disease killed 
off poorer members of society, their social positions were taken over by the sons of the wealthy, biologically spread-
ing less violent, more literate and harder-working behaviour throughout the population. Parthasarathi presents yet 
another view, in which the economically advanced regions of Europe and Asia differed little in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, and subsequently diverged because Europe possessed superior markets, rationality, science
and institutions. Parthasarathi notes that cotton was the most important product for dominating the world economy,
and that cotton from Lancashire dominated the Indian market from around the 1820s.5) Finally, Peer Vries compares 
the state-fi scal system between Britain and China.6)
These historians believe that Europe and Asia traced fundamentally similar paths until a stage in the Early
Modern period called the ‘Great Divergence’, during which Europe overwhelmed Asia economically.
There seem to be three problems in the theses of Pomeranz and other global historians, and in general discus-
sions of the ‘Great Divergence’. First, these global historians defi ne ‘Asia’ vaguely. We cannot agree with Pomeranz 
and consider the Yangtze Delta typical and representative of ‘Asia’. Asia is larger and more varied than Europe, and 
Europe is more homogeneous than Asia in terms of history, culture and environmental conditions. This raises the
question of whether it is possible to compare Asia and Europe using the approaches of these historians.
Second, even if we consider Asia a unifi ed area, can we consider Asia and Europe to have followed similar 
paths (i.e. Smithian economic growth)? Some global historians assume a priori that the two areas took similar 
paths, but I do not believe they have proved this theory. This is one of the most serious defects of the view of global 
historians.
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Third, we must note that before the Great Divergence between West and East, there occurred a Great 
Divergence between Northern and Southern Europe. The economy of Northern Europe surpassed that of Southern
Europe and the Netherlands and Britain became the economic leaders in Early Modern Europe.7) Thus before inves-
tigating the Great Divergence between West and East, we need to consider that in Europe. ‘The Great Divergence
between West and East’ would not have occurred without the previous ‘Great Divergence in Europe’.
Early Modern Europe experienced frequent wars. Many states of this period are called ‘Fiscal-Military States’,8)
meaning states that spend much of their revenue on war. However, despite numerous wars, Europe—especially
Northern Europe—was able to develop economically. Therefore, I wish to ask why European states achieved eco-
nomic growth during this period of warfare. War and economic growth appear closely connected and it is useful to
ask why. Patrick O’Brien has spent many years examining this question.
This question is, as will be discussed later, closely connected with merchant networks centred on Amsterdam
and the diffusion of homogeneous commercial know-how throughout Northern Europe, mainly through Amsterdam.
That is, the Age of the ‘Fiscal-Military State’9), or ‘the long eighteenth century’ established institutions suitable for 
supporting economic growth in Europe because it diffused homogeneous commercial information, intelligence and 
know-how and thus reduced the trading risks.10)
1. The Age of Mercantilism11) and the ‘Fiscal-Military State’
Early Modern Europe is generally considered an age of Merchant Capitalism.12) This means commerce is con-
sidered the driver of the European economy during this period. However, nobody has actually proved this thesis.
Theoretical economics considers Merchant Capitalism to be a form of capitalism in which commerce contributes
disproportionately to the national accounts. However, the Early Modern European economy was overwhelmingly
agricultural.13) Historians have naïvely ignored this paradox. Therefore, we must ask why commerce is considered 
so important. Answering this question requires investigating the economic structure of the Netherlands during its
‘Golden Age’, because it was the most prosperous ‘commercial’ country in Europe. The ratio of commerce to total
economic activity in the Dutch Republic was exceptionally high.14) The Dutch Republic was probably the only
country in Early Modern Europe whose economy depended primarily on commerce rather than agriculture.
The most profi table industry in the age of Mercantilism may have been shipping.15) We should not confuse
trade (exchange of commodities) with shipping (carrying goods). Many European countries adopted trade protec-
tions because they preferred to use their own ships rather than pay to use Dutch ships. The English Navigation Acts
provide an example of such trade protections.16)
In Early Modern Europe transport costs comprised a very large proportion of the total cost of goods.17) Thus
invisible trade may have been much more important than balance of trade for acquiring and growing benefi ts.18)
Furthermore, the Netherlands had the largest mercantile fl eet in Europe, and thus are assumed to have enjoyed the
largest shipping profi ts among European countries.
Merchant Capitalism is a form of capitalism dominated by commerce. However, Merchant Capitalism does not 
necessarily require that the commercial sector contributes more than other sectors to the national accounts. While
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agriculture was the most signifi cant contributor to the national accounts in Early Modern Europe, international trade
was also considered very important, particularly since reducing transport costs was an excellent means of increasing
commercial profi ts and state revenues. We can regard Early Modern Europe as an age of Merchant Capitalism since
many countries excluded Dutch shipping to protect their own commercial profi ts. The Age of Merchant Capitalism
thus corresponds with the Age of Mercantilism.
Jan de Vries and van der Woude consider the Netherlands to be ‘The First Modern Economy’, based on it 
being the fi rst economy in world history to experience sustained economic growth. Sustained economic growth
existed even in the Age of Merchant Capitalism, aided particularly by the reduction of transport costs. The Age of 
Merchant Capitalism saw many technological innovations, albeit fewer than in the Age of Industrial Capitalism,
and some of these innovations related to transport. We may assume that reduced transport costs were the major 
contributor to increased Total Factor Productivity (TFP). The Dutch Republic thus was the fi rst modern economy
in the sense of experiencing sustained growth based on shipping.19)
However, the Dutch Republic was not ‘The First Modern Economic State’, because it was not centralised 
and thus was unlike a conventional ‘state’. England, with its more centralised political organization, thus became
the fi rst modern economic state. The Netherlands and England also differed fundamentally in that the Netherlands
adopted a free-trade policy in Europe (but not in Asia) while England achieved commercial prosperity through ef-
fi ciently protecting its economy. England was the most successful mercantile state,20) and by protecting its commer-
cial interests through Mercantilism it became the most successful ‘Fiscal-Military State’, and thus suitable for the
creation of a commercial society. The term ‘Mercantilism’ is closely connected with the ‘Fiscal-Military State’.
The Early Modern period has been called the Age of Absolutism, and the ‘Fiscal-Military State’ was closely
associated with Absolutism. Absolute states enhanced the power of kings. Fiscal-military states had standing armies
and elaborate bureaucracies, the maintenance of which required signifi cant spending. As Patrick O’Brien has repeat-
edly stressed, states provide public goods, and protect economic and commercial activities.21) The ‘Fiscal-Military
State’ provided protection for mercantile activities and thus enabled economic growth in Northern Europe. In my
opinion, Northern Europe was more successful in establishing ‘Fiscal-Military States’ than Southern Europe, lead-
ing to the Great Divergence between the two areas.
2. Merchant Networks
Nation states emerged in the age of the ‘Fiscal-Military State’ or Mercantilism. During this period, many states
forcibly exiled social outsiders to foster homogeneity. On the other hand, European states could not continue wars
without importing resources and borrowing money externally. European states thus needed cosmopolitan or bor-
derless merchant networks. Although European states persecuted outsiders, they could not pursue wars without 
their assistance. The ‘Fiscal-Military State’ thus inevitably and unintentionally helped to create a homogeneous
commercial society in Northern Europe.
Borderless merchants exchanged commercial information with family members, friends, and affi liated mer-
chants in foreign countries. They shared common forms of commercial information, instruction systems for teach-
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ing merchants, and commercial cultures. In the Age of the ‘Fiscal-Military State’, merchant networks expanded 
rapidly.22) Commercial information was exchanged across country borders, information asymmetries reduced and 
markets functioned better, thus stimulating growth in Northern European economies.23)
One feature of Early Modern Europe was a lack of reliable information. Merchants in Early Modern Europe
traded primarily with family members, friends, or members of the same religious sect. According to de Bruyn
Kops, “Because of the distances and time lags involved, international trade was most dependent on the overlapping
highly personalised merchant networks”.24) Additionally, Philip Kelsal wrote that “Trade was therefore conducted 
within business structures that placed a premium on personal relationships, including blood and family ties, re-
lationships based on friendship and trust, or even patron client relationships”.25) In Early Modern Europe, many
merchants were driven from their homelands by religious oppression. These movements of people were sometimes
called ‘diasporas’. The most important among these persecuted merchant groups were the Sephardim, Armenians,
Huguenots, Jacobites, and Greeks. These groups established extended commercial networks independent of nation
states and contributed to the birth of homogeneous commercial society, which resulted partly from the rise of the
‘Fiscal-Military State’.
Pierrick Pourchasse described the Huguenots as follows;
Although these Huguenots often retained their French nationality and participated in the development of the
important French maritime trade, they were not French merchants. Their activities touched all countries in
Northern Europe. They married their children just as easily in Germany, Switzerland, Holland and Britain as
they did in France, and as the generations followed one after the other, were more or less assimilated into their 
host towns. They used their contacts for commercial ends, preferably with France but also with Britain where
the Huguenot immigration had also expanded. They formed a supranational community whose common inter-
est was trade. Their strongest geographical attachment, if there was one, was not their native country but the
port or country of business.26)
The tendencies described above apply equally to many other cosmopolitan religious sects.
Besides borderless merchant networks, neutrality was also important in Early Modern Europe. Merchants
could not trade formally and directly with enemy countries during wartime, but could do so informally via neutral
states or cities. Hamburg, for example, became notable for its neutrality from 1618. Sweden and Denmark were
also important neutral states. During wartime, belligerent nations were sometimes forced to use neutral ships, or 
to fl y neutral fl ags on their own ships, to continue commerce. For example, when the Netherlands was at war,
some Sephardim fl ed from Amsterdam to Hamburg. Hamburg was a religiously tolerant city. While the city was
Lutheran, and restricted citizenship to Lutherans, Jews were permitted to reside and trade there.27) This contingent 
of Sephardim exploited the commercial and religious relationships between Amsterdam and Hamburg to help the
Dutch continue to trade even during wartime.
Hamburg represents just one example of how neutrality assisted commerce in Early Modern Europe.
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Specifi cally, the case of Hamburg illustrates the relations between nations and borderless merchant networks that 
helped minimise the commercial and economic damage of war. However, it is important to realise that the scale
of wars in Early Modern Europe was extremely limited compared with the Twentieth Century, which also helped 
prevent devastating effects.
The Age of the ‘Fiscal-Military State’ thus stimulated economic growth. The European states experienced 
economic growth because of wars rather than in spite of them. In the eighteenth century, many states in Northern
Europe became ‘Fiscal-Military States’, and Northern Europe began to develop institutions that supported eco-
nomic growth.
3. The Rise of Amsterdam
Amsterdam attracted many immigrants as it grew into a major commercial centre. In 1960, Breulez wrote an article
on the diaspora from Antwerp.28) The contribution of Antwerp to the growth of Amsterdam has since become widely
acknowledged.29) In 2000, Oscar Gelderblom published a book on immigrants from the Southern Netherlands to
Amsterdam.30) In presenting a contrasting view, Clé Lesger criticised Gelderblom mainly for underestimating the
role of Antwerp in the development of Amsterdam, and particularly the number of poor immigrants it supplied.31)
Commercial know-how imported from Antwerp clearly contributed to the rise of Amsterdam, especially in terms
of Baltic trade (Moedernegotie). Antwerp was also a centre for immigration by Genovese. Antwerp was important 
to foreign merchants because of the sheer scale of its supply and demand, as well as its well-developed commercial
infrastructure. For this reason, it is better to speak of ‘trade in Antwerp’ rather than ‘Antwerp trade’.32) Notably,
Cologne merchants from Hansa also traded in Antwerp.
Clé Lesger maintained that Amsterdam was a ‘gateway’ acting as intermediary between its hinterland and the
rest of the world.33) Dutch historiography has emphasised the hierarchy of the Amsterdam staple system and framed 
it in relation to local, regional and international markets. Klein and Veluwenkamp wrote,34) “Surpluses of these re-
gional markets were traded on a market of a higher level, so that a hierarchy of markets came into existence, at the
top of which there was a central permanent entrepôt, the concrete world market”. Many goods traded internationally
were stored in Amsterdam, and many international merchants traded there. Lesger contended that the positions of 
Van der Kooy and Klein and Veluwenkamp were similar.35) Presenting a different perspective, Lesger denied the
existence of a hierarchy of markets dominated by Amsterdam. According to Lesger, Amsterdam was not the most
important market for all commodities. While the city imported many kinds of goods, it did not occupy the top of 
the hierarchy for all of those commodities.36)
Hanseatic merchants dominated the Baltic trade until the middle of the sixteenth century, but by the end of this
century, dominance shifted to merchants of Amsterdam. On the one hand, this shift suggests a discontinuity between
the merchants of Hansa and Amsterdam. However, as Milja van Tielhof showed, several Hanseatic merchants in
Danzig married Amsterdam merchants in the latter part of the sixteenth century.37) The commercial know-how of 
Hanseatic merchants thus may have been transferred to the merchants of Amsterdam. Amsterdam attracted im-
migration from merchants especially after 1578 when it joined the Dutch Revolt.38) From this point Amsterdam
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became the largest melting pot of merchants in Europe, making it diffi cult to generalise about the identity of the
Amsterdam merchants. The commerce of Amsterdam grew with its rapidly growing population. The diversity of 
the residents of Amsterdam forced merchants there to trade with members of other religious groups, a phenomenon
which was unique during this period.
Compared with the European trade, trade with Asia was not important around 1600. Asia was too far from
the Netherlands to strongly infl uence the Dutch economy outside of fi nance. Oscar Gelderblom and Joost Jonker 
wrote, “[in] the evolution of [the] Amsterdam capital market as a consequence of the Dutch overseas expansion
... contrary to commonly held notions about the emergence of secondary markets, private fi nance took precedence
over public fi nance in the Dutch Republic.”39)
Gelderblom and Jonker consider fi nance, especially private fi nance in the VOC (Vereenigde Oostindische
Compagnie), one of the most important foundations of Dutch prosperity. However, in terms of commodity fl ows,
Asia does not seem to have been particularly signifi cant for the Dutch Republic in ‘the Golden Age’. Jan de Vreis
and Ad van der Woude wrote,
The East India Company directors in Patria could not expect to receive replies to their correspondence with
Batavia in less than twenty months. This fact, whose rough equivalent today would arise only with the es-
tablishment of regular trade with the nearest star in our galaxy, is of the fi rst importance in understanding the
VOC’s behavior.”40)
Therefore, given the remoteness of Dutch trading posts in Asia, we should not overemphasise the role of the
VOC in the making of ‘the Dutch Golden Age’.
From the middle of the sixteenth century the increasing population of Europe caused prices of foodstuffs to
rise steeply. The Dutch Republic had previously imported grain only from nearby areas such as France or Germany,
but as its population grew it had to supplement these traditional supplies with grain from the Baltic, especially
Poland (Danzig).41) The Baltic thus became extremely important for the Dutch economy. The Dutch Republic not 
only consumed imported Baltic grain but also re-exported it. From the middle of the sixteenth to the middle of the
seventeenth century, the most signifi cant trading region for the Dutch Republic was the Baltic, especially Poland.42)
From the 1580s, the Dutch began to re-export grain to Italy.43) The basis of Dutch economy around 1600 was the
Baltic grain trade.44)
As mentioned previously, Amsterdam was a melting pot of merchants from different religious, ethnic, and 
other groups. While the Dutch Republic was a Protestant country, it displayed exceptional religious tolerance.
For example, Catholic merchants could trade with Protestant merchants, and Amsterdam was host to a colony
of Sephardim. According to Wallerstein, “the Dutch were liberal and welcomed both Huguenots and Jansenists;
Puritans, Royalists, and Whigs; and even the Socinians. All were benefi ciaries of Holland’s commercial axiom:
‘Forbid as little as possible, accept inputs from everywhere”.45) Amsterdam was a ‘gateway’ not only of commodi-
ties but also of people, money and information. In this sense Amsterdam was the most important city in Europe
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because it was where people could get the most varied and sometimes the most reliable commercial information.
Table 1 shows the origins of the people in Amsterdam. In 1600 those born in Amsterdam comprised only
30% of the total population of the city. By 1650 this ratio had increased to 38.9%, but even in 1800 it remained 
only 53.2%. Many people arrived in and left Amsterdam. Northern Europe had many gateways through which
commodities and information fl owed. Prominent among these were Amsterdam, Hamburg, Stockholm, Göteborg,
Copenhagen, and Antwerp. However, Amsterdam was the largest such gateway during the seventeenth and eigh-
teenth centuries.
Amsterdam was a central city for European commerce and fi nance, and a site for the accumulation of com-
mercial information and know-how. Therefore, many merchants found it convenient to settle there permanently or 
Table 1 The Origins of the Inhabitants of Amsterdam
Birthplace 1600 1650 1700 1750 1800
Amsterdam
20,000 70,000 125,000 112,000 117,000
30.0% 38.9% 53.9% 51.0% 53.2%
Other cities in Holland
2500 10,000 9000 7000 10,000
4.0% 5.5% 3.5% 3.3% 4.2%
Rural areas in Holland
4000 7000 7000 4000 6000
6.0% 4.0% 3.3% 2.3% 3.0%
Other areas in the Netherlands
13,000 23,000 32,000 35,000 36,000
20.0% 13.5% 14.0% 15.9% 16.2%
Total domestic immigrants
19,500 40,000 48,000 46,000 52,000
30.0% 23.0% 20.8% 21.5% 23.4%
Germany
16,000 35,000 32,000 40,000 43,000
25.0% 20.0% 14.0% 18.0% 19.5%
Belgium and France
4500 11,000 7000 1000 1000
6.5% 6.5% 3.0% 0.3% 0.4%
Britain
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
1.5% 0.5% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4%
Other foreign countries*
4000 4000 18,000 17,000 20,000
7.0% 11.0% 10.0% 8.9% 3.1%
Total foreign immigrants
25,500 65,000 57,000 62,000 51,000
40.0% 38.0% 25.3% 27.5% 23.40%
Total 65,000 175,000 230,000 222,000 222,000
* Scandinavian surname is used as the identifi er for this group.
(Source) Jan Lucassen “Immigranten in Holland 1600–1800 Een kwantitatieve benadering”, Centrum voor de Geschidenis
van Migranten Working Paper 3, Amsterdam, 2002, p. 25, table 5.
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temporarily. Merchants that lived in Amsterdam temporarily could acquire vital commercial knowledge that could 
be usefully applied elsewhere. For example, Louis de Geer, who is noted as a founder of the Swedish iron industry,
did not go to Stockholm directly from Liege (his birthplace) but rather went via Amsterdam.46) Many merchants
migrated to Amsterdam, obtained commercial know-how, and then migrated on to other European cities to apply
that know-how. As I have written, the Netherlands was a decentralised country, and did not and could not control
the movements of merchants. Therefore, the Dutch Republic was able to contribute to the rise of the economies of 
Northern Europe.
4. Diffusion of Information and Homogeneous Commercial Know-how47)
The ‘gateway’ of Amsterdam facilitated the spread of commodities, people, money and information throughout 
Early Modern Europe. The merchants of Amsterdam used commission agents to reduce their transaction costs by
decreasing monitoring costs.48) However, while using commission agents allowed the Dutch to reduce transaction
costs, it ultimately harmed them by diffusing their know-how and thus decreasing their commercial advantages.
Dutch use of commission agents gave foreign merchants opportunities to acquire the commercial know-how that 
the Dutch had accumulated over many years.
In Early Modern Europe, merchants shared similar commercial information, commercial cultures and in-
struction systems for teaching merchants. Educational tracts for merchants had been published in medieval Italy.
However, the most infl uential work on this subject was Le parfait Négociant by the French writer Jacques Savary.49)
This work was copied in numerous foreign languages. The concept of copyright did not yet exist, and so writers
not only freely copied but also made revisions to meet their own needs. In Britain, Malachy Postlethwayt wrote
The Universal Dictionary of Trade and Commerce,50) which was largely a translation of Le parfait Négociant. The
merchant tracts51) were read by both Catholics and Protestants, and probably also by Jews, contributing signifi cantly
to decreasing transaction costs and simplifying cross-cultural trade.
Merchant networks expanded rapidly. The expansion of these networks reduced transaction costs and pro-
moted economic growth in Europe. Much commercial information was planted in Amsterdam, where it developed 
further before being re-exported to other European trading cities, especially London and Hamburg.
Moreover, prijscourant (price current) started to be printed in the Netherlands to transmit commercial infor-
mation.52) At fi rst only a small number of merchants could access the price current. However, by the seventeenth
century it was also printed in Italy, England and France. Before the introduction of price current, price information
was circulated among private networks and tended to be monopolised. After its introduction, price information was
universally available, and distributed weekly. The publication of printed price and commodity information saw
annual European markets give way to continuous urban market places, and previously seasonal exchange rate cur-
rent or commodity price current began to be published weekly, even twice-weekly. Commodity price current was
adopted by anyone with the money to buy it, and listed all locally traded products. The data had an offi cial character 
because offi cials monitored the publications in which it appeared.53)
The Dutch case was not the fi rst example of published price current, but was the most important in terms of 
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information distribution. The earliest surviving examples of published commodity price current are from Venice,
and the practice later spread to the major northern European trading cities of Frankfurt, Amsterdam and Hamburg.
This shift from Southern to Northern Europe was important. The publication of commercial newspapers refl ected 
the economic power of cities. Economic power and commercial publications shifted from Italian cities, especially
Venice, which dominated in the fourteenth and fi fteenth centuries, to Antwerp in the fi rst half of the sixteenth cen-
tury, then Genoa in the second half of the sixteenth century, then Amsterdam from the early seventeenth to the early
eighteenth century, and fi nally to London, which ruled for the next two centuries. Thus in Northern Europe, Dutch
was the language of many of the earliest commodity prices.54) Demonstrating the economic power of the Dutch
at this time, Louis de Geer was ennobled in Sweden for his contributions to the Swedish iron industry in spite of 
speaking Dutch rather than Swedish.55)
While price current published in Amsterdam undoubtedly reduced transaction costs for the Dutch, it also
reduced transaction costs for other nations. Availability to merchants of printed price information made it easier for 
them to obtain specialist knowledge. The Dutch could have exploited information asymmetries to their advantage
if they had not issued price current. While failing to publish price current would have increased their own transac-
tion costs, others would have faced even larger increases. The Dutch published price current to reduce their own
transaction costs. The Dutch Republic was the most advanced economy in Europe, and Dutch merchants valued 
personal profi t over national profi t. This philosophy saw information on commodity prices gradually transformed 
from a private good to a public good.
In other European countries the consular system developed, with France, Sweden, and Denmark all good 
examples.56) The consular system was unnecessary for the Netherlands because growth in Dutch trade was driven
by merchants, with state power playing a relatively insignifi cant role. However, European countries other than the
Netherlands suffered ‘Economic Backwardness’. European states thus intervened in their economies to catch up
with the advanced economy of the Netherlands. The ‘Fiscal-Military State’ was one example of such economic
intervention, and relied on military power to protect markets.
The ‘Fiscal-Military State’ supported economic growth because it ensured merchants had suffi cient informa-
tion to trade. Information on goods fl owed effi ciently and became increasingly transparent. Customers could learn
about commodities available for purchase. Commodity chains could spread information on traded commodities,
and information asymmetries steadily reduced. These factors signifi cantly reduced transaction costs in Northern
Europe.
5. Imports of Commodities from the New World and Asia
In this section we consider imports of colonial goods and expanding merchant networks in ‘the long eighteenth
century’.
In the Early Modern period, new kinds of commodities were imported to Europe, especially from the New
World. In the eighteenth century, the rise of the Atlantic economies infl uenced Europe more than Asian trade did.
Even in the Dutch Republic, the Atlantic trade became dominant during this period.57) The French economic his-
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torian F. Crouzet considered France to have experienced ‘Americanization’ during the eighteenth century.58) The
whole of Northern Europe experienced a similar phenomenon.
Commodity imports in England, France, Hamburg and the Baltic display this phenomenon of 
‘Americanization’. Table 2 lists England’s imports in the eighteenth century. From this table we can see that at the
beginning of the eighteenth century, the North Sea and the Baltic were England’s most important trading partners.
The proportion of Atlantic trade remained small from 1669–1701. It was only during 1772 to 1774 that imports
from the Atlantic increased dramatically. Thus we should not exaggerate the role of the Atlantic in the hegemonic
transition from the Netherlands to England.59) Moreover, while England’s trade with Asia increased, the increase
was much smaller than that of its trade with the Atlantic.
Regarding French trade, Table 3 shows that sugar and coffee proportionally were very signifi cant. St. Domingo
was France’s main supplier of sugar and coffee, which went primarily to Bordeaux. From Bordeaux these goods
were re-exported mainly to Hamburg60) or Amsterdam.
In the eighteenth century, France established a maritime empire similar to the British Atlantic Empire.
Table 2 English overseas trade fl ows (£’000, offi cial values)
North Sea Baltic economies Mediterranean 
and Southern
Europe
Atlantic 
colonies and 
the West Indies
Asia Total
Holland other countries
Northern
Europe N. Sea Total
1669–1701
Imports 519 889 583 2,001 1,555 1,107 756 5,849
Exports 1,078 781 255 2,114 1,484 539 122 4,433
Re-exports 712 451 80 1,243 224 312 14 1,986
1722–24
Imports 575 784 591 1,950 1,783 1,679 966 6,758
Exports 936 598 216 1,750 2,141 758 93 5,042
Re-exports 970 778 46 1,794 176 487 19 2,714
1752–54
Imports 909 863 1,043 2,215 1,597 2,684 1,086 8,203
Exports 938 1,214 271 2,423 2,879 1,707 667 8,417
Re-exports 836 1,085 91 2,012 285 627 81 3,492
1772–74
Imports 447 795 1,599 2,841 1,829 4,769 1,929 12,753
Exports 646 822 301 1,769 2,211 4,176 717 9,853
Re-exports 1,240 1,766 217 3,223 453 972 63 5,818
[Source] David Ormrod, The Rise of Commercial Empires: England and the Netherlands in an Age of Mercantilism, 1650–
1770, Cambridge, 2003, p. 354.
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Furthermore, most people accept that in the seventeenth century Bordeaux traded mainly with Amsterdam, while
in the eighteenth century Hamburg became increasingly important.61)
Nevertheless, analysing merchant networks yields a different picture, in which the transition from Amsterdam
to Hamburg should not be exaggerated. For example, the De Bary family of Amsterdam underwent a diaspora
which saw them move against the expected direction to settle in both Hamburg and Bordeaux. Protestant merchant 
networks continued to link not only Amsterdam and Bordeaux, but also Hamburg and Bordeaux, despite the edict 
of Nantes being revoked in 1685.62) Borderless Protestant merchant networks persisted and contributed to economic
growth in Northern Europe.
Hamburg was merely a small town in the early modern age. Its population was just 50,000–60,000 in 1680
and grew to 90,000 by 1750.63) However, Hamburg was the third largest port in Europe for trade with the Americas
and the Far East, trailing only to Amsterdam and London.64) Hamburg was particularly signifi cant for its trade with
South America. During ‘the long eighteenth century’, some of Brazil’s sugar, which became more important than
gold, was exported to Hamburg.65)
From the viewpoint of commercial networks in ‘the long eighteenth century’, Amsterdam, London and 
Hamburg were the three most prominent cities in Northern Europe, or indeed in Europe as a whole. The decline of 
Amsterdam increased the signifi cance of London and Hamburg. However, the increased signifi cance of London
Table 3 French imports (1,000 livres)
Year Cotton Wool Silk Sugar Coffee
1754 9.0 15.9 23.5 36.9 15.3
1755 11.0 20.5 20.0 35.5 13.7
1766 13.9 16.0 14.5 34.5 11.3
1770 20.0 14.2 6.5 54.8 58.7
1771 13.5 12.4 6.1 53.1 55.1
1772 12.0 16.1 6.5 45.9 42.7
1773 12.5 21.6 13.0 52.5 44.3
1774 15.4 14.1 6.8 68.6 34.3
1775 13.3 14.9 7.1 46.8 32.1
1776 18.5 18.1 12.2 89.4 38.6
1777 18.6 23.4 9.0 108.1 40.7
1778 13.5 17.2 33.5 108.1 26.3
1782 21.0 28.0 25.7 132.3 52.5
1787 42.9 20.9 28.4 71.2 76.7
1788 40.4 17.4 23.2 90.2 93.0
[source] Haruhiko Hattori, Furansu kindai bouekino seiseito tenkai (Modern French Trade), Kyoto,1992, p. 70.
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and Hamburg was made possible partly because of the export of Dutch commercial know-how. As Larry Neal
demonstrated, Amsterdam and London became more closely integrated after the South Sea Bubble.66) Moreover,
the integration between Amsterdam and Hamburg was also reinforced. Amsterdam merchants migrated to Hamburg
during times of war, and contributed enormously to the foundation of the Bank of Hamburg.67) Furthermore, many
Hamburg merchants settled in London,68) and Hamburg was called ‘the most English city’.69)
The triangular relationship linking Amsterdam, London and Hamburg became a key foundation of economic
growth in Northern Europe. These three cities exchanged information, merchants and money. During ‘the long
eighteenth century’, they carried out a division of labour in commerce and fi nance. For example, England used 
Amsterdam banks for remittances to Russia until 1763,70) Hamburg banks for remittances to Finland until around 
1800,71) and banks in both Hamburg and Amsterdam for remittances to Sweden during the latter half of the eigh-
teenth century72) England’s banks had limited fi nancial power in ‘the long eighteenth century’. With the rise of conti-
nental trade (especially with the Atlantic) and the decline in the fi nancial power of Amsterdam, the roles of London
and Hamburg grew. The integration of the networks of these three cities enabled the growth of Northern Europe.
Table 4 shows the weight of colonial goods shipped into the Baltic during the eighteenth century. Dutch ships
dominated, but Swedish ships became increasingly important as the century wore on. Swedish ships used their 
neutrality to advantage by carrying commodities for other states during wartime. Numerous colonial goods were
imported into the Baltic. The main colonial commodity was sugar,73) which was exported from St. Domingo to
Bordeaux and then re-exported to the Baltic or Sweden. Colonial goods were transported not only by the Swedish
but also by Flemish and Scottish networks in Europe.74)
Table 5 shows the volume of imports in the Baltic Sea ports. The total volume of colonial imports increased 
steeply. Most notable is the increasing volume of imports to the Swedish port of Stettin. This increase resulted 
from the policy of Frederick the Great of building sugar refi neries.75) More than 70% of the colonial goods im-
ported by France were re-exported.76) France thus exported more colonial goods to Northern Europe than any other 
country.77)
Table 4 Weight of colonial goods shipped to the Baltic through the Sound (1,000 pounds)
ships 1710–10 1711–20 1721–30 1731–40 1741–50 1751–60 1761–70
The Netherlands 18,342 28,877 32,776 33,248 29,813 31,415 71,338
England 5762 11,392 16,448 13,559 9609 18935 34,109
Hamburg 37.5 113 1,454 1,073 2,224 3,170 8,792
Sweden* 95 25 11,656 13,792 19,599 19,240 21,782
Denmark 4,004 98 3,234 4,082 3,935 6,771 7,232
Total 30,530 43364 76,143.6 85,559 100,940 128,437 218,185
* mainly Stockholm
[source] Nina Ellinger Bang and Knud Korst (eds.), Tabeller over Skibsfart og Varetransport gennem Øresund 1661–1783,
Vols. I–II: 3, Copenhagen and Leipzig 1930–1953.
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We must note the importance of water systems in Northern Europe. Hamburg was situated on the Elbe, Danzig
was on the Vistula, Sttetin was on the Oder, St. Petersburg was on the Neva, Riga was on the Dvina, and Stockholm
used the Mälaren water systems. These cities can be considered ‘gateways’ into Europe for colonial goods (mainly
sugar) exported from the New World and Asia—especially the former. Products were transported through these
gateways and into their hinterlands via water systems. The extent of the hinterlands varied according to city, but in
all cases the water systems assisted in distribution. The development of water systems and their connection with
long distance trade is a special characteristic of Northern Europe.78)
I may be opening myself to criticism for underestimating the role of Asian commodities in the economic
growth of Northern Europe. However, Jan de Vries wrote, “with the probable exception of the period 1600–1650
(the ‘crisis of the seventeenth century’), the Atlantic trade grew at over twice the long term rate of Asian trade”.79)
Thus, we should take care not to be Asia-centric.
Table 6 shows that the increase in Asian exports to Europe via the cape-route during the seventeenth century
was impressive, but the volume and value of the overland route remained signifi cant.80) Volumes of overland trade
during the seventeenth century are extremely diffi cult to estimate and the tendency is to underestimate them.
However, commodities traded overland essentially went to Southern Europe, with the route from Persia to Livonia
being one of the main exceptions.81) Therefore, the infl uence of the overland trade on Northern Europe was limited.
A simple but crucial fact is that while Asian goods have a long trading history in Europe, New World goods
were unknown to Europeans until Columbus. Therefore, commodities from the New World had a much greater 
impact on European economic growth during the Early Modern period. Since Northern Europe was more closely
connected with the New World, these New World goods disproportionately infl uenced the economies of Northern
Europe.
European merchants could not trade without exact information on commodities and prices, and thus commod-
Table 5 The destinations of colonial goods shipped through the Sound (pounds)
Year Danzig Sweden* Stettin St. Petersburg Riga
1701–10 14,201,961 2,749,219 92,676 0 1.427,287
1711–20 29,669,704 12,001,932 251,305 1,170,070 2,567,588
1721–30 46,263,537 25,709,187 2,515,918 8,556,402 5,084,161
1731–40 22,268,740 21,062,459 2,203,880 15,068,467 2,516,203
1741–50 45,032,275 47,670,376 5,633,509 28,911,517 4,005,571
1751–60 71,695,483 69,113,422 27,412,922 50,184,048 5,213,505
1761–70 109,636,076 92,656,229 95,571,365 82,483,425 6,879,054
* mainly to Stockholm
[source] N. E. Bang and K. Korst (eds.), Tabeller over Skibsfart og Varetransport gennem Øresund 1661–1783, Vols.
I–II: 3
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ity price current was very useful for them. However, commodity price current alone did not provide suffi ciently
precise commodity data. Merchants thus also sent commodity and price information in the form of correspondence.
The correspondence included commodity characteristics, qualities, and other important information on the com-
modities they purchased and sold. This type of correspondence essentially comprised explanatory sheets regarding
the traded commodities. Merchant correspondents belonged to informal information exchanges, within which
exchanges of correspondence stimulated exchanges of commodities. In this respect borderless merchant networks
worked very effectively. The authorities supported formal information exchanges or diffusions, while cosmopoli-
tan merchant networks supported informal information exchanges. Both formal and informal information sharing
promoted the exchange of precise commodity information and commodity chains especially in Northern Europe.
6. Concluding Remarks
Northern Europe established economies institutionally suited for commercial expansion and economic develop-
ment. The most important point is that the Northern European economies allowed the rapid fl ow of precise com-
modity information, thus reducing transaction costs.
Amsterdam was the most effective centre for bringing together commercial information, intelligence and 
know-how. From Amsterdam this information diffused elsewhere. According to Clé Lesger, Amsterdam was a cen-
tre of information supply,82) where merchants obtained global perspectives and possibilities for lucrative arbitrage
between geographically separated markets.83)
In ‘the long eighteenth century’, the importance of Amsterdam as a commercial and information centre de-
clined, and the positions of London and Hamburg rose. However, Amsterdam contributed to the rise of London84)
and Hamburg because Amsterdamers settled in these cities. The triangle was very signifi cant because the integration
Table 6 Shipping tonnage returned to Europe from Asia by decade
Years Tonnage Years Tonnage
1601–10 58,200 1701–10 150,168
1611–20 79,185 1711–20 198,677
1621–30 75,980 1721–30 348,024
1631–40 68,583 1731–40 367,367
1641–50 112,905 1741–50 340,012
1651–60 121,905 1751–60 417,359
1661–70 121,465 1761–70 433,827
1671–80 125,143 1771–80 461,719
1681–90 172,105 1781–90 501,300
1691–1700 171,540 1791–95 261,804
[source] Jan de Vries, “Connecting Europe and Asia: A Quantitative Analysis of the Cape-Route Trade, 1497–1795”, p. 61.
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of the three cities promoted the movement of people, information and commodities.
‘The long eighteenth century’ was also the period of the ‘Fiscal-Military State’. This period saw religious op-
pression force merchants to relocate to foreign lands, facilitating the establishment of a homogeneous commercial
society in Northern Europe.
In her paper, Marjolein ‘t Hart, posed the question; “Why did the Netherlands achieve economic growth during
a period of war?”.85) She argued that wars created institutions in the Netherlands that encouraged economic growth.
My paper adopts this theory and expands it to Northern Europe. Before the Vienna Protocol in 1815, Northern
Europe successfully created a society suited to economic development because it formed a homogeneous com-
mercial society owing to a war-induced diaspora, and states provided the public goods necessary for commercial
prosperity and helped ensure the supply of reliable commercial information via formal media and informal mer-
chant networks. The triangle of Amsterdam, London and Hamburg functioned very well in expanding commerce
and fi nance owing to exchanges of people and information among these three cities.
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